Sixth framework programme of the european commission

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*The Turkish Court of Accounts is the Supreme Audit Institution of Turkey. It was established as a court in the last century and operates under the Constitution. The Constitution requires it to audit the government accounts relating to revenue, expenditure and property financed by the general and annexed budgets on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). TCA has two main functions: judicial and auditing. The judicial work is carried out by specialised chambers in which court members try accounts and either acquit or hold liable those responsible for them. The audit work is carried out by auditors. TCA is independent of both the legislative and executive branches of the government.

37 In 2005 two corruption-related commissions were established in parliament to investigate the gasoline smuggling, and illegal public offering (money collection) and misuse of depositors. A parliamentary anti-corruption committee has issued a long report (1,200 pages!) and started investigations into a number of high level improprieties. In January 2004, a working group was brought together to assist the parliamentary committee in charge of the Action Plan on Enhancing Transparency and Good Governance in the Public Sector. The working group consists of employees from the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Finance, the Treasury and the State Planning Organisation.

38 As regards independence and impartiality of the judiciary, various provisions of the Turkish Constitution guarantee judicial independence. Article 9 provides that judicial power is exercised by independent courts. Under Article 138 judges are protected from receiving instructions, recommendations or suggestions that may influence them in the exercise of their judicial power. Furthermore, no legislative debate may be held concerning the exercise of judicial power in a pending trial, and both the legislative and the executive are required to comply with court decisions without alteration or delay. Article 140 requires judges to discharge their duties in accordance with the principles of the independence of the courts and the security of tenure of judges. However, Article 40(6) provides that judges and public prosecutors are attached to the Ministry of Justice in so far as their administrative functions are concerned. These constitutional guarantees of an independent judiciary are reflected in various provisions of domestic law, including the Law on Judges and Public Prosecutors, the Criminal Procedure Law, the Civil Procedure Code and the Penal Code.

The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors is the supreme governing body of the judiciary. The judicial members of the High Council are appointed by the President of the Republic. The High Council is composed of five judges, the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice. The High Council does not have its own secretariat or budget and its premises are inside the Ministry of Justice building. The Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice, appointed by the Minister, is an ex-officio member of the Council.

The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the Ministry of Justice are responsible for the appointment of graduates of the Judicial Academy as judges and prosecutors. Graduates seeking entry to the judicial profession, as either judges or prosecutors, first take a written examination administered by the School Selection and Placement Centre which administers all examinations for entry to higher education institutes in Turkey. Candidates who pass the written examination are then interviewed by a panel composed of representatives of the

Ministry of Justice, and the successful candidates are admitted to the Judicial Academy for two years’ training. The oral examination enables the Ministry of Justice to exercise considerable influence over the recruitment of candidate judges and prosecutors. Although salaries for judges and prosecutors have been increased significantly in recent years, they nevertheless remain modest.

39 The budget of the Ministry of Justice was increased by 16.5% in 2005 compared to 2004. Nevertheless, expenditure on the judicial system remains low compared to the average in the EU Member States. The number of judges and prosecutors has remained largely stable; there are currently 5 952 judges and 3 179 prosecutors in service and a further 1 053 judges and prosecutors in training.

A law adopted in December 2004 provided for the recruitment of 4 000 additional judges and prosecutors, 100 judicial inspectors and 6 619 court administrative staff. This recruitment would represent an increase of almost 50% in the number of judges and prosecutors in Turkey and would contribute significantly to reducing delays in court proceedings. However, concern has been expressed by the senior judiciary in Turkey that the influence of the Ministry of Justice in the recruitment of such a substantial number of additional judges and prosecutors may gravely undermine the independence of the judiciary.

The Ethical Board for Public Servants started to operate in September 2004. A circular was adopted in 2004 instructing public bodies to co-operate fully with the Board. A regulation on the code of ethics for public employees was adopted in April 2005. The regulation sets out a detailed code of behaviour for senior public officials and grants members of the public the right to petition the Ethical Board concerning contraventions of the code. It does not apply to other categories such as elected officials, academics, military personnel or the judiciary. One former Prime Minister and seven former ministers were tried before the High Tribunal on charges of corruption.

40 See “REPORT: Kick-Off-Meeting”, Sofia, 2-3 February 2006.

41 One of the members of the Investigation Commission on Mercümek was Ali Rıza Gönül who was a MP for DYP and the writer of the report. He disowned the allegations stated in his own report on the grounds that no sufficient evidence was found.

42 The nine who voted for the acquittal were from the DSP, ANAP and the MHP. The True Path Party (DYP) and FP committee members voted to have him put on trial. MHP member Resat Dogru abstained.

43 The Decision fo the Parliament related to the former prime minister A. Mesut YILMAZ and former minister of state Güneş TANER”, Decision No: 815, Decision Date: 13.7.2004, (Official Gazette: 17 July 2004 - 25525)

44 Nedim Şener, Tepeden Tırnağa Yolsuzluk (Corruption from Head to Toe), Metis Yayınevi, Istanbul, 2001, p. 74.

45 They complained that after the “rumors” against Mercümek started, donations made to pro-Islam International Human Relief Organization (IHH) decreased.

46 This report would not be possible without a number of persons who provided generous and most valuable help. Although the text expresses solely the views of its authors, we would like to thank Josip Kregar, Violeta Liović, Ana Profeta, Munir Podumljak, Krešimir Sikavica, Zorislav Antun Petrović, Ivan Landripet, Nataša Đurović, Dalibor Zidanić, Velimir Čolović, Jurica Malčić, Blanka Katunarić, Dora Čulo, and Greta Augustinović Pavičić for their cooperation and expertise.

47 is the biggest on-line job search service.

48 In 2006, the new National Program for Combating Corruption declared four highly problematic areas to be targeted: the judiciary, the health system, local government and political parties.

49 The new National Anti-Corruption Program clearly stated the need for more comprehensive and systematic research on corruption.

50 Parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing the first national anti-corruption strategy (2002) remained inactive until this year.

51 Officially entitled: ^ The National Program for Combating Corruption 2006-2008.

52 The program was approved by the Parliament on March 31, 2006.

53 Current draft of the Bill has been criticized by a number of experts for several deficiencies, including not specifying the institution/actors responsible for sanctioning irregularities.

54 We are not aware that GT approach/methodology had previously been applied in social science research in Croatia.

55 For example, distinguishing between various levels of codes is laborious and nontransparent, especially considering the fact that ATLAS.ti in intended to be used in GT research (where few levels of codes are quite common).

56 At the project consortium meeting in Istanbul, Romanian team has presented a similar idea of using three groups of codes (definitions of corruption; values promoted; mechanisms of combating corruption).

57 Problems of ‘realistic codes’ and ‘abstraction levels’ are also discusses further in this Report (see: Interpretation).

58 The models are elaborated in chapter ^ Results further in the text, and some dilemmas about the empirical basis of the theory and ‘theory saturation’ are discusses in chapter Interpretation.

59 It is not our intention here to engage further in the ongoing discussion between the objectivist and constructivist ‘camp’ regarding the philosophical foundations of Grounded Theory Method (see, for example: Charmaz, 2000; Bryant, 2002; 2003). We just wanted to make our coding process and the ideas that have guided the process fully transparent, and to point to outlined ‘interpretative problem’. However, we do not find it crucial, since the theory proposed will be additionally “checked against the facts” during the interviews in the next project phase.

60 The demands concerning the Bill on the Financing of Presidential Campaign included additional control mechanisms regarding candidates’ spending (LN 117), a donation limit of 7 million Kunas, introduction of sanctions (LN 123) and transforming the responsible body (Državno Izborno Povjerenstvo /the State Election Committee/) into a permanent and professionally equipped institution (LN 127).

61 The State Electoral Commission is an independent body, chaired by the president of the Constitutional Court.

62 National Anti-Corruption Program emphasized the following four aims: (a) sanctioning the corrupt ones; (b) strengthening professional ethics; (c) improving responsibility and user-friendliness of public administration; and (d) increasing citizens' trust in institutions.

63 It should be noted though that strengthening the Internal Control department was included among the priorities listed in the document.

64 The New National Anti-corruption Program strongly emphasized the importance of prevention, too (Barbić, 2006).

65 Current deficit of the police prevention efforts was attributed primarily to the lack of staff.

66 Which seems to contradict one of the findings of the EC report (European Commission, 2005) stressing the importance of improving the level of financial investigation expertise.

67 The five extended reports of the Parliament's Institutions and Transparency Committee on party financing were provided to us in August-September 2006 in hard copy, not allowing time to be analysed using Atlas-ti.

68 In this paragraph are recorded all data sources and material we used for the report and eventually analysed with Atlas-ti, while in the Evaluation units of the Case studies are included only those texts that analysed for the case.

69 Regarding details about the empirical method applied in the overall research project see more in the introduction to this state of the art report.

70 Concerning details about the case of the waste incinerator in Cologne there are certain differences between the presentations in the media and the investigation findings of the general attorney of the Court of the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia. Evaluating the acts of the court’s verdict there were noticed some facts that provide a more objective account of the course of the whole affair in comparison to other public sources.

71 Moste part of the description of the case is based on the following source: Hans Leyendecker: Corruption in practice. Case study: Oversized incinerator burns up Cologne’s cash, in Transparency International, Annual Report 2005, pp. 51-55.

 The numbers/capital letters refer to the original pagination f the stenographic protocols [pdf-format].

 The number of the protocol and the lines cited are created by the hermeneutic unit of analysis designated by the content-analytical software atlas-ti.

 Since the session protocols of the parliamentary inquiry committee are only in print form the use of the atlas-ti was not possible. Therefore the pagination follows the original stenographic papers: In brackets the numbers of protocol and page. [Source: German National Parliament, Archive, 14th legislation period, 1. Inquiry Committee “Party donations”]

72 In her field of competence and responsibility lay only the acquisition of donations. She undertook efforts to win as many donations from private persons as possible in order to achieve such a volume of funds that would enable the party not to be dependent on donations from economy and commerce [P119: 16].

73 In this thematic context she recounts the arguments of Kiep regarding the loose organisational structure of the treasury of the Christian Democrats – the treasurer being only responsible for the acquisition of donations – in direct juxtaposition to the ‘hierarchical’ management of the party finances by the SPD [P36: 25-27 and P119: 12]. In addition she claims that her proposal to merge the domains of donations acquisition and accounting management was turned down by the Chancellor Kohl himself [P36: 28]. Not being responsible for the ways the party finances were disposed of is another reason for her not knowing anything about how the secret accounts were used among other things to supply various party committees with money securing in exchange their loyalty to the chairman of the party [P17: 27-29; P119: 12].

74 She attributes the fact that by 1994 the volume of donations was drastically reduced to the negative (discouraging) effect the then new law of party financing – making all donations over 20.000 DM declarable –, had on the willingness of the possible donors [P17: 68].

 The number of the protocol and the lines cited are created by the hermeneutic unit of analysis designated by the content-analytical software atlas-ti.

 Since the session protocols of the parliamentary investigation commission are only in print form the use of the atlas-ti was not possible. Therefore the pagination follows the original stenographic papers: In brackets the numbers of protocol and page. [Source: German National Parliament, Archive]

75 In this way he implies that if the government of the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen had in due time implemented the European laws for bidding the decision would have complied with the transparency principle and therefore there would be no ‘irregularities’ leading to corrupt conduct [ibid.].

76 This reasoning draws upon the statements of Rüther, the chef of the parliamentary fraction of the SPD in Nordrhein-Westfalen, according to which regarding the acquisition of donation funds there existed the ‘golden rule’ of asking those companies for financial support that had in the past signed contracts with the city council [P121: 13].

 Since the session protocols of the parliamentary investigation commission are only in print form the use of the atlas-ti was not possible. Therefore the pagination follows the original stenographic papers: In brackets the numbers of protocol and page. [Source: German National Parliament, Archive]

77 Of course, when necessary, certain exceptions must be made: In case of the CDU party financing scandal all persons that were involved in receiving funds that they did not have the intention to declare in the party books must be objected to close scrutiny [P121: 15].

78 This move is necessitated by the need to differentiate between briberies that the SPD officials in Cologne received for the waste incinerator deal – a criminal offence prosecuted by the general attorney –, and the funds other party officials received without naming the donors or camouflaging them by giving party members tax exemption receipts for these ‘donations’. However, Müntefering cannot deny the interplay of the two cases since it was the corruption affair in connection with the construction of the incinerator in Cologne that threw light on some till then unexamined ‘irregularities’ in the party’s fund raising elsewhere [P121: 26].

79 In the following analysis there will be no distinction made between the pattern of perception (“definitions”) of corruption between Judges and Lawyers. However, a comparative analysis of Judges and Lawyers will be central focus in the execution and analysis of the interviews with experts in the second research phase.

80 This became a truly dangerous for the project only after the Green Party enters politics in the North Rhine-Westphalia region. The Green Party Environmental Minister Höhn was a committed adversary of Cologne’s Waste Incineration Plant and not only for the obvious ecological grounds but also economical and financial grounds. As had already become apparent in other municipalities, that had built oversized Waste Incineration Plants, more waste was needed for the economically viable operation than the municipalities them self produced. So that ‘imports’ were sought after heavily promising private companies large profits at the tax payers expense. An inquiry in Cologne’s Municipal Council into how much them scrapping of the project would cost at that time, was refuted solely by the argument that compensation in a triple digit million figure would have to be paid by the city.

81 In both cases are negotiations on account of Suspicion of Betrayal of Confidence and Tax evasion.

82 In the case of the Waste Incineration Plant the bribes amounted to more than 24 million German Marks, 1 percent for the Director of the AVG and the Plant Construction Company each, as well as ½ percent for the political mediator and the private AVG shareholder who took care of Swiss bank accounts. How high these bribes are is shown by the comparison to the calculated profit of 5 percent of the total cost.

83 An example for such an argument is given later on.

84 One must formulate precisely: the ‘subjectively intended meaning’ of an ideal type, constructed by the researcher, the rational protagonist.

85 After a discussion lasting several hours with the Head of the Department and two of his staff the files were handed over to the research group, which was thus able to gain a first insight into the work of the anti-corruption officers.

86 See Erwin K. und Ute Scheuch: Cliquen, Klüngel und Karrieren. Über den Verfall der politischen Parteien –eine Studie, Reinbek, Rowohlt, Reihe rororo Aktuell No. 12599, 1992

87 Niklas Luhmann: Die Realität der Massenmedien, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 3rd Edition 2004, p. 9

 The number of the protocol and the lines cited are created by the hermeneutic unit of analysis designated by the content-analytical software Atlas.ti.

 The numbers/capital letters refer to the original pagination f the stenographic protocols [pdf-format].

88 Transparency International 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index,>.

89 Transparency International UK, ‘Corruption and Money Laundering in the UK: One Problem, Two Standards’, October 2004.

90 Alan Doig, ‘An Apparent Abuse in the Use of Dining Rooms: The British Parliament and Lobbying’,
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